Up until recently the United States and its European allies have sought to obtain Caspian Basin oil and gas from pipelines running from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey that bypass both Russia to the north and Iran to the south. Russia’s quick, successful military intervention in Georgia during August 2008, though, has raised the prospect that pipelines through Georgia can easily be shut down or even taken over by Russia any time Moscow wants. This poses difficult foreign policy choices for the United States and Europe.
If it appears likely that Caspian pipeline routes through Georgia will now be seen as subject to Russian intimidation or control, then what course of action should the United States and Europe undertake?
Should they seek rapprochement with Iran in the hope of relying on pipeline routes through it that would be much less subject to Russian interference? Or is reliance on Iran so undesirable that the U.S. and Europe should accept Russian dominance over the South Caucasus and adjust their policies to accommodate Moscow?
The choices that the United States and Europe face in the Caucasus are not new. Often in the past, states have had to deal with not just one, but two potential opponents. While confronting both simultaneously might be desirable, resource constraints can make this impractical. Under these circumstances, states sometimes decide which of their potential opponents is the greater threat that needs to be focused on, and attempt to minimize the threat posed by the other through accommodating or befriending it.
For this policy to succeed, however, depends on whether the state or states making this choice determine accurately which of the two opponents really is the greater threat and which is really the lesser one that is safe to befriend or accommodate.
Making this choice correctly can lead to a highly successful rapprochement that long outlasts the original impetus for it. A good example is the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s which occurred largely as a result of Washington and Beijing both seeing Moscow as the principal threat to both, but has continued long after the downfall of the USSR.
Inaccurately identifying which of two opponents is less of a threat, though, can have disastrous consequences. But even when the greater opponent and the lesser opponent are accurately identified, allying with or accommodating the lesser opponent is only likely to succeed if it too sees the former as its greater opponent.
What are the implications of this for America and Europe in dealing with Russia and Iran? One is that allying with Russia against Iran is probably not a viable option since Moscow does not appear to see Tehran as a meaningful threat to it at present. Indeed, the Kremlin may not see Iran as a threat at all unless and until Iran actually acquires nuclear weapons - if then.
A review of the Iranian press, especially since Russia’s intervention in Georgia, shows that many Iranian officials and commentators do see Russia as a threat. The top Iranian leaders, though, do not appear to see it as an imminent threat. And until they do, Tehran appears unlikely to pursue rapprochement with the West on terms that the United States (at least) would find acceptable.
There is also, of course, the added complication that the United States and Europe might disagree about whether Russia or Iran is the greater threat — or how to proceed even if they can agree on this. European-American disagreement, of course, would provide an opportunity for Russia and/or Iran to exploit.
The United States and Europe have yet to work out a common approach on this issue. One thing, though, should be clear: pursuing policies in opposition to both Russia and Iran simultaneously, as the United States has done, may no longer be a viable option.
*Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.